Trump weighs F‑35 sale to Saudi Arabia as MBS heads to Washington: Congress, Israel, and U.S. arms‑export law set the guardrails

What’s new, what’s next

The law: How an F‑35 sale would be vetted

Any F‑35 transfer would be governed by Section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), which requires formal notification to Congress and gives lawmakers a statutory review window (typically 30 days for non‑NATO countries) to pass a joint resolution of disapproval. AECA also embeds the U.S. commitment to preserve Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), obliging the executive branch to certify that sales in the region will not erode Israel’s advantage. ^[6]

Operationally, proposed government‑to‑government sales move through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which posts case notifications and policy updates; as of this week there has been no public DSCA notification of an F‑35 package for Saudi Arabia. ^[7]

The politics: Oversight, human rights, and a push to “streamline” arms sales

Even if the White House backs the sale, Congress will assert prerogatives. Lawmakers across parties have scrutinized major Saudi transfers since the 2018 murder of Jamal Khashoggi, which U.S. intelligence concluded the crown prince approved; the optics of a red‑carpet visit and new arms deals have already drawn criticism. ^[9]

At the same time, House Foreign Affairs leaders have been advancing legislation to accelerate foreign military sales and raise notification thresholds—a shift transparency advocates warn would weaken oversight just as record‑size packages are contemplated. Expect that debate to shape the F‑35 review if a notification is sent. ^[10]

Israel’s “QME” and the normalization lever

Israel remains the only Middle Eastern operator of the F‑35. Jerusalem’s position—support only if sale is tied to Saudi‑Israel normalization—creates a diplomatic linkage that could either facilitate a grand bargain or become a de‑facto veto point if normalization conditions (notably Palestinian statehood benchmarks) can’t be bridged. ^[11]

“Washington weighs weapons sales to the Middle East in a way that ensures Israel maintains a ‘qualitative military edge.’” — Prior U.S. policy framing reiterated in recent reporting about the Saudi F‑35 bid. ^[12]

Separate reporting last month described U.S.–Saudi talks on a bilateral defense pact—akin to the recent U.S.–Qatar arrangement—which, if inked this week, would further bind the security relationship and influence calculations on advanced jets. ^[13]

Industrial and technology risk considerations

Any F‑35 deal would intersect with ongoing program realities—Lockheed’s TR‑3 upgrade integration and Block 4 roadmap—as well as technology‑security questions. U.S. officials have flagged concerns that sensitive capabilities could be exposed to China if safeguards aren’t airtight, a risk that would factor into end‑use monitoring and configuration decisions for any Saudi variant. ^[14]

Scenarios on the table

How Congress could respond

Why this matters now

The prospective F‑35 sale would anchor a wider recalibration of U.S.–Saudi ties—potentially including a bilateral defense pact and deeper investment flows—while knitting those moves to a regional strategy centered on Israel’s security architecture and a still‑elusive normalization track. The coming days will reveal whether the White House seeks to leverage the crown prince’s visit into a single “grand bargain” or opts for incremental steps that postpone the F‑35 question. ^[31]

What to watch this week 🗓️

• Any official White House announcement or DSCA notification initiating an AECA clock. ^[32]
• Whether joint statements tie defense cooperation to Israel–Saudi normalization benchmarks. ^[33]
• Early reactions from House and Senate foreign affairs/security leaders on QME and safeguards. ^[34]

Analysis and implications

From an arms‑transfer policy perspective, the F‑35 question sits at the intersection of three forces: the administration’s desire to re‑cement Riyadh as a cornerstone security partner; Israel’s statutory QME and political weight in Washington; and a Congress simultaneously seeking both speed and scrutiny in foreign military sales. A conditioned sale that advances normalization and locks in stringent tech‑security controls would likely face the least resistance, but it is also the hardest to execute diplomatically. Absent that, expect a bruising—but clarifying—fight on Capitol Hill over the future of U.S. arms‑sales governance and the strategic terms of the U.S.–Saudi bargain. ^[35]

References

• AP preview of the Nov. 18 White House visit and expected deal signings. ^[36]
• Reuters on the potential F‑35 deal and reported likelihood of a sale; Reuters on the Saudi request clearing a Pentagon policy hurdle. ^[37]
• Axios on Israel’s conditional support—normalization first. ^[38]
• Financial Times on a prospective U.S.–Saudi defense pact under discussion. ^[39]
• Cornell LII: AECA §36 (22 U.S.C. §2776) on congressional review and Israel’s QME. ^[40]
• DSCA policy site update (no F‑35 to KSA notification as of Nov. 13). ^[41]
• Washington Post on Khashoggi and political context of the visit. ^[42]
• Defense One on F‑35 upgrade/delivery status and program risks. ^[43]
• Al‑Monitor/Reuters on U.S. intelligence concerns about Chinese access to F‑35 tech. ^[44]
• House Foreign Affairs Committee releases on arms‑sales “streamlining,” and Transparency International’s critique. ^[45]